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ABSTRACT: The article analyses the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Skanska Industrial. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU 
recognised for the first time the so-called “economic succession doctrine” in dam-
age claims concerning a breach of EU competition rules. In the judgment, the CJEU 
relied on its well-established case law. From this point of view, the ruling is “nothing 
extraordinary”. Nevertheless, the judgment represents an important milestone that 
contributes to the development of damage claims in Europe. 
The article first discusses the origins of the economic succession doctrine, which 
derives from the broad concept of “undertaking” developed by the CJEU case law and 
the so-called “single economic entity” doctrine. Afterwards, the article discusses the 
Skanska Industrial case, in particular by comparing the opinion of Advocate General 
(AG) Wahl with the CJEU ruling in the case. The article concludes by discussing the 
potential consequences of the CJEU ruling in Skanska Industrial on private enforce-
ment of EU competition law, as well as the questions that remain open after the 
judgment. 
After Skanska Industrial, it remains unclear how the disclosure of evidence will take 
place in practice in the context of a damage claim following a corporate restructuring. 
Secondly, the limits of the economic succession doctrine remain unclear: it is unclear 
when a corporate restructuring indeed leads to the establishment of a “new” under-
taking, free from the antitrust liability acquired by its predecessor. Finally, it remains 
unclear whether Skanska Industrial case law could also be extended to other remedies 
besides damage claims, such as actions requesting a court injunction, compensation 
for unjust enrichment, or a declaration that a contract is null and void. The article 
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argues that in the coming years the CJEU will probably be called to clarify Skanska 
Industrial case law in order to answer these remaining questions. 
KEYWORDS: Economic succession doctrine, single economic entity doctrine, private 
enforcement of EU competition law, damage claims, preliminary ruling
I. Introduction
On 14 March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
delivered its landmark ruling in Skanska Industrial.1 The case originates 
from a request for preliminary ruling submitted by the Finnish Supreme 
Court. In its essence, the case concerns the application of the so-called 
“economic succession doctrine” in damage claims concerning a breach of 
EU competition law. This important issue had not been clarified by the 
Damages Directive.2 The CJEU’s preliminary ruling, therefore, should 
be welcomed, since it sheds light on an important aspect for the develop-
ment of antitrust damage claims in Europe. However, as further discussed 
in the following sections, the judgment also leaves some questions open, 
which will probably have to be further clarified by the Court in its future 
jurisprudence.
After an explanation of the origins of the economic succession doctrine 
and its relevance in public enforcement of EU competition law, the arti-
cle discusses the Skanska Industrial case. In particular, after an overview 
of the national proceedings that led to the request of preliminary ruling, 
the article compares the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Wahl with the 
CJEU’s ruling in the case. The article concludes by discussing the poten-
tial consequences of the CJEU’s ruling in Skanska Industrial on private 
enforcement of EU competition law, as well as the questions that remain 
open after the judgment.
II.  From the single economic entity to the economic succession 
doctrine
The origins of the economic succession doctrine discussed by the CJEU in 
Skanska Industrial stem from the concept of “undertaking” under EU law. 
1 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204.
2 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. OJ L-349/1, 5.12.2014.
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Several provisions of the Treaty of Rome referred to the word “undertak-
ing” without however providing a clear definition of this concept.3 This is 
not surprising: when the Treaty was drafted, the definition of entreprise in 
France was quite different from the concept of Unternehmen in Germany 
or impresa in Italy. The definition of undertaking had, in fact, deep roots 
in national corporate law and was different in every Member State. Since 
the EU founding fathers could not find an agreement on what represented 
an undertaking in the Treaty, they left to the Court of Justice the task of 
clarifying this legal concept.
In its jurisprudence, the CJEU has traditionally opted for a “broad” 
definition of the concept of undertaking. In particular, rather than refer-
ring to national (diverging) definitions, the Court shaped an EU concept 
of undertaking, defined as any “entity performing an economic activity”.4 
Via this broad definition, the Court aimed at covering under the scope of 
the Treaty both private and State-owned undertakings. Only public enti-
ties that exercised States’ sovereign powers (e.g. military activities, policy 
and administration of justice) clearly fell outside the definition of under-
taking and, thus, the scope of the Treaty. Secondly, the Court stressed in 
its jurisprudence that the entity could be considered an undertaking, sub-
ject to the application of the Treaty, even if the latter was not classified as 
a firm under national corporate law.5 Finally, the concept of “economic 
activity” implied that the entity sold a good/service in the market,6 but it 
did not require the entity to necessarily make any profit out of the activi-
ty.7 As a consequence of this broad definition, in Montessori, for example, 
the EU General Court recognised that a private elementary school was an 
3 In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the word “undertaking(s)” is 
repeated 52 times.
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. OJ C-326/47, 
26.10.2012.
4 Judgment of 23 April 1991, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, C-41/90, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21.
5 “The concept of undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regard-
less of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed”. Ibid.
6 Judgment of 12 September 2000, Pavel Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten, C-180/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, paragraph 75.
7 Judgment of 1 July 2008, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko 
Dimosio, C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, paragraph 27.
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undertaking within the scope of the Treaty, since the school provided an 
educational service though it did not make any profit.8
In line with this broad definition, in Estaciones de Servicios the Court 
further clarified that an undertaking is “any economic entity, even if, from 
a legal perspective, that unit is made up of a number of natural or legal 
persons”.9 According to the CJEU, a “single economic entity” may include 
the mother company and its subsidiaries, which are thus considered a sin-
gle undertaking under the Treaty. The Court followed a functional defi-
nition of undertaking: since the mother company and its subsidiaries do 
not compete in the market, they should be considered part of the same 
entity.10 Since its early case law, the Court thus introduced an innovative 
approach to consider multinational corporations as single economic enti-
ties; an approach that clearly diverges from national corporate law, which 
usually considers each sub-unit of these complex organisational structures 
as a separate firm.
The single economic entity doctrine has had important implications for 
the enforcement of EU competition law. First of all, in Imperial Chemical 
the Court of Justice recognised the joint parent-subsidiary liability in EU 
competition law. According to the Court, since “the subsidiary does not 
decide independently upon its own conduct on the market but carries out 
(…) the instructions given by the parent company”, the latter company 
should be liable for the breaches of EU competition law carried out by its 
subsidiary.11 Via this functional approach, the Court increased the deter-
rent effect of the sanctions imposed by the Commission for violations of 
EU competition law. Via the joint parent-subsidiary liability, in fact, the 
Commission would calculate the amount of the fine not only based on 
the annual turnover of the firm directly involved in a breach of EU com-
petition rules (e.g. a cartel), but on the basis of the turnover of the entire 
economic group. 
In its case law, the Court of Justice has clarified that the joint parent-
subsidiary liability exists only if the mother company exercises a “control” 
8 Judgment of 15 September 2016, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl v. European Commission, 
T-220/13, ECLI:EU:T:2016:484, paragraph 137.
9 Judgment of 14 December 2006, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio 
v. Compañía Española de Petróleos SA, C-217/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:784, paragraph 40.
10 Okeoghene Odudu and David Bailey, “The single economic entity doctrine in EU competition 
law”, Common Market Law Review 51 (2014): 1729.
11 Judgment of 14 July 1969, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, C-48/69, 
ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, paragraph 132. 
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over its subsidiary.12 In particular, if the parent company is the only share-
holder of the subsidiary (i.e. it holds 100% of its shares), there is a presump-
tion that the parent company has full control of the subsidiary’s activities, 
and thus it was aware of the breach of EU competition rules carried out 
by the subsidiary.13 By contrast, the Commission has the burden of proof 
of showing the presence of control in the other cases. In particular, the 
Commission can look at the institutional control (e.g. how many repre-
sentatives the mother company can appoint in the board of the subsidi-
ary), rather than at the effective exercise of control.14 In other words, the 
Commission can prove that the mother company is jointly liable by look-
ing at the governance structure of the subsidiary, without the need to find 
direct evidence that the mother company directly ordered the subsidiary 
to engage in an anti-competitive practice. 
The single economic doctrine has been debated for a number of years in 
the literature; a number of arguments have been put forward in favour and 
against such doctrine. Besides the increased deterrent effect against pos-
sible violations of EU competition rules, a positive effect of this doctrine is 
that it forces the parent company to actively monitor its subsidiary in order 
to avoid a competition law violation.15 On the other hand, a number of 
authors have argued that the deterrent effect of the single economic entity 
doctrine is limited in practice. The Commission, in fact, rarely imposes 
the maximum fine provided under Art. 23(2) Reg. 1/2003 (i.e. 10% of the 
annual turnover of the undertaking).16 In particular, firms have often relied 
on the “inability to pay” argument in order to ask the Commission for a 
fine reduction.17 Besides its limited impact on fines, the single economic 
entity doctrine would not necessarily strengthen the monitoring activi-
ties of the parent company over its subsidiary, since antitrust compliance 
12 Judgment of 14 July 1969, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, C-48/69, 
ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, paragraph 133.
13 Judgment of 10 September 2009, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v. Commission, C-97/08 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:536, paragraph 62. 
14 Aitor Montesa, and Angel Givaja, “When parents pay for their children’s wrongs: Attribution 
of liability for EC antitrust infringements in parent-subsidiary scenarios”, World Competition 29, 
no. 4 (2006): 566. 
15 Carsten Koenig, “An economic analysis of the single economic entity doctrine in EU competi-
tion law”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 13, no. 2 (2017): 295.
16 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L-1/1, 4.1.2003. Art. 23(2).
17 Koenig, “An economic analysis of the single economic entity doctrine in EU competition law”: 
305.
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programmes have become a rather common practice in every corporation, 
even in the lack of a joint parent-subsidiary liability.18 Thirdly, as further 
discussed in the following sections in relation to Skanka Industrial, the 
single economic entity doctrine deviates from the principle of individual 
firm liability, a core principle of every national corporate law.19 Finally, 
the single economic entity doctrine might also affect the parent com-
pany value when its shares are traded in financial markets.20 In particu-
lar, (small) shareholders of the mother company are usually not aware of 
anti-competitive practices carried out by one of its subsidiaries. However, 
an antitrust fine might negatively affect the annual profits of the mother 
company, and thus the shareholders’ dividends. 
Besides the joint parent-subsidiary liability, another important con-
sequence of the single economic entity doctrine is the extension of the 
antitrust liability in case of corporate restructuring. As recognised by the 
CJEU in ETI, “when an entity that has committed an infringement of the 
competition rules is subject to a legal or organisational change, this change 
does not necessarily create a new undertaking free of liability for the con-
duct of its predecessor that infringed the competition rules”.21
Similar to the joint parent-subsidiary liability, the so-called “economic 
succession doctrine” has primarily a deterrent goal: it aims at avoiding 
that a firm carries out a corporate restructuring (e.g. transfers its assets to 
a different legal entity) in order to escape from the payment of the antitrust 
fine.22 Due to the progressive increase of the antitrust fines recorded in 
recent years, such scenario is not so remote; as further discussed in section 
III, it is at the core of the Skanska Industrial case. As mentioned above in 
relation to the joint parent-subsidiary liability, the economic succession 
doctrine represents a major deviation from the principle of individual firm 
responsibility enshrined in national corporate law and, thus, generates a 
potential conflict between national and EU law.
The CJEU’s jurisprudence discussed in the previous paragraphs refers 
to the Commission’s power to enforce EU competition rules. While the 
joint parent-company liability and the economic succession doctrine are 
18 Koenig, “An economic analysis of the single economic entity doctrine in EU competition law”: 309.
19 James Hennah, “The role of undertakings in private law following Shanska”, Global Competition 
Law Review 12, no. 2 (2019): 75. 
20 Koenig, “An economic analysis of the single economic entity doctrine in EU competition law”: 318.
21 Judgment of 11 December 2007, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Ente tabac-
chi italiani – ETI SpA, C-280/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:775, paragraph 42.
22 Montesa and Givaja, “When parents pay for their children’s wrongs”: 559.
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well-established principles in relation to the Commission’s enforcement 
powers of EU competition rules, such principles are mostly unknown in 
the national competition law of the majority of the Member States. This is 
due to the principle of individual firm responsibility that usually character-
ises national corporate law. A good example is represented by the Sausages 
case: in 2014, the Bundeskartellamt sanctioned 21 sausages manufactur-
ers involved in a price-fixing cartel, imposing a record fine of € 338 mil-
lion.23 After the imposition of the fine, 3 firms sanctioned by the German 
National Competition Authority (NCA) transferred their assets to other 
firms, members of the same economic groups. Due to the lack of the single 
economic entity doctrine in German law, in 2016 the Bundeskartellamt 
stopped the fining proceedings in relation to the 3 firms involved in the 
corporate restructuring.24
The Sausages case had major policy repercussions, both in Germany and 
in the EU. In June 2017, the German Act Against Restraints of Competition 
(GWB) was amended, in order to implement the Damages Directive.25 In 
particular, a new Section 81(3)(a) GWB was introduced. The latter pro-
vision mentions that the Bundeskartellamt may also impose fines on the 
legal persons “which continued to operate the undertaking in economic 
continuity”. The provisions did not transpose the Damages Directive, but 
rather aimed at reacting to the legal loophole identified by the Sausages 
case by introducing for the first time the single economic doctrine in the 
German competition law. 
The Sausages case had also broader policy repercussions at the EU level: 
the ECN+ Directive adopted in December 2018, in fact, introduces the 
single economic entity in the national competition law of every Member 
State.26 In particular, the preamble of the ECN + Directive recognises that 
“the notion of ‘undertaking’ (…) should be applied in accordance with the 
case law of the Court of Justice. Accordingly, NCAs should be able to apply 
23 “Bundeskartellamt imposes fines on sausage manufacturers”. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Meldungen%20News%20Karussell/15_07_2014_Wurst.html. 
24 “Proceedings against companies of Clemens Tönnies group concluded – fines of 128 million 
euros cancelled due to restructuring measures”. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/
Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/19_10_2016_Wurst.html. 
25 An official English translation of the GWB is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_gwb/. 
26 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to 
empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. OJ L-11/3, 14.1.2019.
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the notion of undertaking to find a parent company liable, and impose 
fines on it, for the conduct of one of its subsidiaries, where the parent com-
pany and its subsidiary form a single economic unit”.27
In addition, similarly to Art. 23(2) Reg. 1/2003, Art. 15 ECN + Directive 
recognises that NCAs can impose a fine up to 10% of the annual worldwide 
turnover of the “undertakings” involved in a competition infringement – 
i.e. the broad concept of “undertaking” developed by CJEU case law is thus 
transposed into national competition law.
The ECN+ Directive leads to the extension of the single economic entity 
doctrine in every EU Member State. Consequently, every NCA will also 
apply the joint parent-subsidiary liability and the economic succession 
doctrine when they enforce Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level. 
EU Member States have to transpose the ECN + Directive into national 
competition law by February 2021.28
III. Skanska Industrial 
The CJEU case law concerning the single economic entity doctrine con-
cerns the EU Commission power to enforce Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU (i.e. 
public enforcement of EU competition law). The ECN + Directive has 
extended such case law to the power of NCAs in enforcing national com-
petition law. By contrast, the ECN + Directive does not deal with damage 
claims started in national civil courts in relation to a breach of EU compe-
tition rules. Similarly, the Damages Directive recognised the joint liability 
of cartelists in the contest of damage claims,29 but it did not expressly men-
tion either the joint parent-subsidiary liability or the economic succession 
doctrine. The Damages Directive refers to the expression “undertaking” 
without, however, providing a clear definition of this concept.30
As discussed in the following sub-section, the uncertainty linked to the 
application of the single economic entity doctrine in the contest of private 
enforcement of EU competition law led the Finnish Supreme Court to refer 
a preliminary ruling question to the CJEU in the contest of the Skanska 
27 Directive 2019/1, preamble, paragraph 46.
28 Directive 2019/1, Article 34.
29 Directive 2014/104 (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the com-
petition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. OJ L-349/1, 5.12.2014. 
Art. 11.
30 Article 2 of Directive 2014/104 includes a list of definitions relevant for the Directive, but it does 
not refer to the concept of “undertaking”.
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Industrial case. The case represents well how the single economic entity 
doctrine, and its consequence in terms of economic succession doctrine, 
conflict with the principle of individual firm liability enshrined in national 
corporate law.31
III.1 Skanska Industrial – proceedings at the national level
Skanska Industrial originates from the Asphalt legal saga, a major cartel 
case which kept the Finnish courts busy during the past decade. After 
years of investigations, in 2004 the Finnish Competition and Consumer 
Authority successfully referred the case to the Market Court.32 The lat-
ter imposed a fine on several Finnish companies involved in a bid rigging 
cartel affecting the road construction industry between 1999 and 2002.33 
In 2009, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court upheld the previous 
ruling of the Market Court.34
The judgment of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court concluded 
the public enforcement side of this legal saga, and it opened the private 
enforcement one: 39 cities started a follow-on damage actions against the 
cartelists, relying on the 2009 judgment as res judicata. In particular, the 
city of Vanta started a damage claim at the Helsinki District Court against 
a number of cartelists, including Skanska Industrial.35
During the years following the cartel discovery by the Finnish NCA, 
most of the companies involved in the cartel started a process of corporate 
restructuring. In particular, Skanska Asfaltti Oy acquired all the shares 
of Sata-Asfaltti, one of the firms originally involved in the cartel, which 
had started a voluntary liquidation procedure. Skanska Asfaltti Oy later 
changed its legal name into Skanska Industrial Solution, the main claim-
ant in the case brought to the CJEU for preliminary ruling.36
31 Hennah, “The role of undertakings in private law following Shanska”: 75.
32 “FCA’s finishes asphalt cartel investigations”. Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority. 
https://www.kkv.fi/en/current-issues/press-releases/finnish-competition-authority/2003/fcas-
finishes-asphalt-cartel-investigations/ 
33 Judgment of 19 December 2007, Finnish Market Court decision 94/04/KR.
34 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 10.
35 John Connor and Toni Kalliokoski, “The Finnish Asphalt Cartel court decision on damages: An 
important EU precedent and victory for plaintiffs”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February (2014): 1.
36 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100.
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Helsinki District Court upheld the damage claim against Skanska 
Industrial. In particular, the court referred to the principle of full effec-
tiveness of EU law in order to justify the application of the economic suc-
cession doctrine in the case, though the latter doctrine did not exist under 
Finnish civil law.37 
In 2013, Helsinki Court of Appeal dismissed the damage claim, rely-
ing on the defendant argument that Finnish civil law did not recognise 
the principle of economic continuity, which was thus not applicable in the 
case.38
In view of the diverging rulings by the two lower courts, the Finnish 
Supreme Court decided to stay at proceedings and refer three questions for 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU.39 In essence, the Supreme Court asked the 
Court of Luxembourg to clarify whether the economic succession doctrine 
was applicable to damage claims arising from a breach of EU competition 
rules.
III.2 The AG’s opinion in Skanska Industrial
AG Wahl delivered his opinion on the case on 6 February 2019.40 In his opin-
ion, the AG referred to the well-established Manfredi case law,41 whereby 
“any individual” has the right to claim compensation for the harm caused 
by a breach of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU.42 Although it is up to the Member 
States to define the rules applicable to damage claims (i.e. principle of pro-
cedural autonomy), such rules cannot jeopardise the “full effectiveness” of 
EU competition rules. According to the Advocate General, a national rule 
that allowed a cartelist to escape from the payment of a damage compen-
sation via a simple corporate restructuring did not “ensure an individual 
37 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 12.
38 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 13.
39 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 22.
40 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100.
41 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paragraph 30.
42 Judgment of 13th July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 59.
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right to compensation”.43 According to the AG, in order to safeguard the 
full effectiveness of EU competition law enforcement, the “determination 
of the persons liable” for a breach of EU competition rules should be a uni-
form concept under EU law, rather than left to the procedural autonomy of 
EU Member States.44 The Advocate General thus concluded that “there is 
nothing extraordinary” in recognising the economic succession doctrine 
in the context of damage claims of EU competition law.45 
Indeed, the AG’s opinion is nothing extraordinary in recognising the 
application of the economic succession doctrine; it builds upon the tradi-
tional line of reasoning followed by the CJEU since Courage v. Crehan to 
set aside national procedural rules that could hamper the “full effective-
ness” of private enforcement of EU competition law.46 More interesting is 
the additional consideration put forward by the Advocate General con-
cerning the nature of damage claims. In his opinion, the AG recognised 
the complementarity of public and private enforcement of EU competition 
rules, emphasising that damage claims have a “deterrent” effect in relation 
to future competition law violations.47 Nevertheless, the CJEU has never 
accepted the “deterrent” effect of damage claims: an American approach 
to private enforcement of antitrust law that conflicts with the compensa-
tory nature of damage claims in Europe.
III.3. The CJEU ruling in Skanska Industrial
The CJEU delivered its ruling in Skanska Industrial on 14 March 2019.48 
The final judgment of the Court is indeed “nothing extraordinary”: in 
line with the AG’s opinion, the CJEU referred in its previous case law 
concerning the “full effectiveness” of EU law in order to recognise the 
economic succession doctrine in damage claims concerning a breach of 
EU competition rules. In particular, the Court argued that “the concept 
43 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paragraph 78
44 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paragraphs 66-67
45 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paragraph 80
46 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, 
paragraphs 24-26.
47 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 6 February 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial 
Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:100, paragraphs 46-47.
48 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204.
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of ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, which consti-
tutes an autonomous concept of EU law, cannot have a different scope with 
regard to the imposition of fines by the Commission under Article 23(2) of 
Reg. 1/2003 as compared with actions for damages for infringement of EU 
competition rules”.49
As a consequence, CJEU case law concerning the economic succession 
doctrine, deriving from the broad definition of “undertaking” within pub-
lic enforcement of EU competition rules, was also applicable to damage 
claims for breaches of Arts. 101-102 TFEU.
Since the Court simply referred to its previous case law, Skanska Industrial 
was decided by the single, rather than the grand chamber.50 Overall, the 
Court followed the line of reasoning proposed by the Advocate General. 
On the other hand, unlike the AG’s opinion, the Court confined its ruling 
to the question asked by the Finnish Supreme Court, without discussing 
the deterrent effect of damage claims.
IV. Skanska Industrial: consequences and open questions 
As discussed in the previous section, Skanska Industrial generated a long 
and intense judicial debate among Finnish civil courts on the applica-
tion of the economic succession doctrine: a legal concept developed by 
the CJEU in the context of public enforcement of EU competition law, but 
an “alien” to the civil law systems of the majority of EU Member States, 
like Finland.51 However, both the Advocate General and the CJEU found 
“nothing extraordinary” in recognising such doctrine in the context of 
damage claims concerning a breach of EU competition rules.
In spite of the short length of the judgment, Skanska Industrial might 
have important consequences in the coming years. In particular, the rul-
ing might incentivise the number of damage claims in the future, avoid-
ing corporate restructuring from representing a procedural obstacle to 
the identification of the legal entity liable to pay the damage compensa-
tion. The extended liability introduced by Skanska Industrial will also 
have a consequence in the context of corporate acquisitions: the acquiring 
49 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy e a., C-724/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204, paragraph 47.
50 Lena Hornkohl, “The economic continuity test in private enforcement of competition law – the 
ECJ’s judgment in Skanska Industrial Solutions”, European Competition Law Review 40, no. 7 
(2019): 343.
51 Hennah, “The role of undertakings in private law following Shanska”: 75.
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company will have to carefully scrutinise the previous antitrust liability of 
the acquired firms, since it it might be asked to pay compensation in the 
context of a possible damage claim.52 Therefore, antitrust due diligence will 
become particularly important in the context of any corporate acquisition.
Although the approach followed by the CJEU in Skanska Industrial 
aimed at promoting damage claims, a number of issues remain open after 
the judgment. First of all, although the successor company will be poten-
tially liable for a breach of EU competition rules, it will not necessarily 
have access to the evidence concerning the infringement carried out by 
the economic predecessor.53 In other words, although a claimant might ask 
the judge to order the successor company to disclose certain documents 
concerning the competition law infringement,54 the successor company 
might simply not have such documents. As a consequence, the defendant 
will have to prove not to be in possession of the requested documents. On 
the other hand, in spite of the prima facie liability of the successor com-
pany, the claimant will not be able to collect important evidence from the 
defendant to quantify the suffered harm and to establish its causal link 
with the alleged infringement. Such problem will be particularly relevant 
in stand-alone, rather than in follow-on actions. In the first type of dam-
age actions, in fact, the claimant heavily relies on the disclosure of evi-
dence ordered by the court. 
An issue that the CJEU has not clarified in Skanska Industrial concerns 
the “limits” of the economic succession doctrine in the context of damage 
claims. As argued in section II, in ETI the CJEU recognised that a corporate 
restructuring does not necessarily create a “new undertaking” free from 
the antitrust liability of its predecessor.55 Indeed, in Skanska Industrial the 
firm simply changed its legal name in order to escape from the payment 
of the fine imposed by the Finnish NCA and the possible damage com-
pensation. However, corporate restructuring could be more complex: 
52 Hennah, “The role of undertakings in private law following Shanska”: 79.
53 Hennah, “The role of undertakings in private law following Shanska”: 79.
54 It is worth noticing that Article 5(2) of the Damages Directive has harmonised and strengthened 
the power of national civil courts in ordering the disclosure of evidence in the context of antitrust 
damage claims. In particular, national courts can “order the disclosure of specified items of evi-
dence or relevant categories of evidence circumscribed as precisely and as narrowly as possible on 
the basis of reasonably available facts in the reasoned justification”. 
Directive 2014/104, Article 5(2).
55 Judgment of 11 December 2007, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Ente tabac-
chi italiani – ETI SpA, C-280/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:775, paragraph 42.
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establishing whether the new legal entity is indeed a “new undertaking”, 
rather than a successor of the previous firm, is not always a straightforward 
exercise.56 In the context of corporate restructuring, for instance, other 
investors might become additional shareholders of the firm. Alternatively, 
the firm could sell a subsidiary previously involved in an antitrust viola-
tion. The types of corporate restructuring are numerous, and it is unthink-
able that the economic succession doctrine could be applicable in every 
case. As discussed in section II, the CJEU has recognised the joint parent-
subsidiary liable only when the mother company exercises a control over 
the subsidiary – i.e. when the parent company could not be unaware of 
the competition law breach by its subsidiary. In the context of the eco-
nomic succession doctrine, the CJEU has not introduced a similar case 
law. Therefore, the CJEU might be called, in the coming years, to clarify 
Skanska Industrial case law, further explaining the conditions where a 
corporate restructuring indeed leads to a “new undertaking” free from the 
antitrust liability acquired from the predecessor.
The last question that remains open after Skanska Industrial concerns 
its scope of application: should the economic succession doctrine be appli-
cable only to damage claims? Alternatively, should this doctrine be appli-
cable to the other categories of remedies under private enforcement of 
EU competition law (i.e. actions requesting a court injunction, compensa-
tion for unjust enrichment, declaration that a contract is null and void)? 
As discussed in section III, Skanska Industrial was a follow-on damage 
claim. Consequently, in its preliminary ruling, the CJEU only referred to 
damage actions. In Skanska Industrial, however, the Court relied on the 
general principle of full effectiveness and the uniform concept of “under-
taking” under EU law, rather than on the Damages Directive. Damage 
claims are a sub-category in private enforcement of competition law; a 
category that has been extensively harmonised at the EU level during 
the past decade. Nevertheless, in principle, there would be no reason 
to exclude a priori the application of the economic succession doctrine 
to other types of remedies in the context of private enforcement of EU 
competition rules. As in Courage v. Crehan,57 for example, a complain-
ant could ask the court to declare an exclusive distribution agreement 
null and avoid for being in breach of EU competition rules. In light of 
56 Aidan Robertson, “Skanska Industrial Solutions: What does the Court of Justice’s landmark judg-
ment mean for cartel damages litigation?”, European Competition Law Review 40, no. 8 (2019): 350.
57 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.
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the economic successor doctrine, this remedy would be applicable even 
if the agreement had been concluded between the complainant and the 
“predecessor” firm, and later inherited by the defendant as a consequence 
of a corporate restructuring. 
V. Conclusions
In Skanska Industrial the CJEU recognised the economic succession doc-
trine in damage claims for breaches of EU competition rules on the basis of 
its well-established case law. From this point of view, the ruling is indeed 
“nothing extraordinary”. Nevertheless, the judgment represents an impor-
tant milestone that contributes to the development of damage claims in 
Europe. 
A number of questions, however, remain open after the judgment. In par-
ticular, it remains unclear how the disclosure of evidence will take place in 
practice in the context of a damage claim following a corporate restructur-
ing. Secondly, the limits of the economic succession doctrine still remain 
unclear: it is unclear when a corporate restructuring indeed leads to the 
establishment of a “new” undertaking, free from the antitrust liability 
acquired by its predecessor. Finally, it remains unclear whether Skanska 
Industrial case law could also be extended to other remedies besides dam-
age claims, such as actions requesting a court injunction, compensation 
for unjust enrichment, or a declaration that a contract is null and void.
Skanska Industrial is thus an interesting ruling that confirms a well-
established approach by the CJEU, eager to harmonise via its preliminary 
rulings “bits and pieces” of national procedural rules applicable to damage 
claims for breaches of EU competition rules. However, the judgment raises 
a number of questions which will probably have to be answered by the 
Court in further preliminary rulings in the coming years.
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